https://liveuamap.com/en
ISW Daily Briefs:
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-updates
Russian losses -- this seems to follow the UKR General Staff released numbers along with a "rule of thumb" calculation for wounded.
Remember 1) Wounded does not mean permanently removed from combat; 2) I suspect Russia may have a worse KIA:WIA ratio than the US has in recent large wars -- they may be closer to WWII ratios along the lines of 1:2.; 3) the "intended for invasion" is from what was staged in February and likely some replacements have been moved up, but in many areas the "armed forces" total likely way overstates what is available on time lines measured in months to being returned to combat ready status from long term storage.
https://minusrus.com/en?v=1648007431105
Background Material:
The Battalion Tactical Group that makes up the basic manuever element of the Russan army:
https://www.benning.army.mil/Armor/eARMOR/content/issues/2017/Spring/ARMOR%20Spring%202017%20edition.pdf
White Phosphorus is not banned:
https://www.lawfareblog.com/jus-bello-white-phosphorus-getting-law-correct
Finnish Intelligence lecture on Russian culture:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kF9KretXqJw&t=0s
In annoying computerized English if you just want to listen and don't speak Finn: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5F45i0v_u6s
Ethnicity of Russian military (hint: It's not Russian.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1506479259866394625.html
The difficulty of taking out bridges by air:
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/1293bridge/
Setting 155mm fuzes:
https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2006/fuze/walker.pdf
More on Excalibur:
https://ndiastorage.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/ndia/2012/annual_psr/Milner.pdf
Basic forms of manuever:
http://goodbadstrategy.com/wp-content/downloads/FM100-5_Envelopment.pdf
Analysis:
https://archive.ph/2022.04.27-221025/https://www.economist.com/briefing/how-deep-does-the-rot-in-the-russian-army-go/21808989#selection-827.698-834.0
Need some telenko (sp?)
Emotional reaction from Pentagon spokesman:
https://youtu.be/592w6smbHi4?t=1958
7 February 2022 -- Russian analysis right down to predicting lend-lease returning:
https://russiandefpolicy.com/2022/02/07/
Of course they don't have functioning satellites...
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-satellites-ukraine-war-gps/31797618.html
Russia will always...Russia:
WWI?
...go back even further.
Although the Ministry of the Navy acknowledged the importance of wireless telegraphy in naval affairs, in deed it did not show any initiative at all. In reality, the Navy remained without radio equipment, and the production of such was at the lowest possible level. The Russo-Japanese War, which broke out in 1904, showed how criminal was the complacency of bureaucratic heads in the Army and Navy... they did not take a single practical step to organize properly the production of radioequipment and to supply the units of the Army and warships with it.... Makarov spoke of the absurd state of affairs in the country, for although radio was invented in Russia, the country had to order radio equipment from abroad.”
That Russian ship that was falsely reported as sunk? The Admiral Makarov? Yeah, that's the guy it was named after. He was killed early on in the Russo-Japanese War.
Thus, and unexpectedly, the Russians faced an enemy with superior although not cutting edge communications technology. The Russians were at a disadvantage in capability with unsuitable German equipment, and the Japanese had an enormous advantage in readiness. The Russians hardly understood how to use their equipment. The Japanese wove theirs into a powerful, integrated communications web, on land and at sea.
https://www.californiahistoricalradio.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/BartWirelessWar190205Lee.pdf
Fascinating use of FIRMS to show a disparity between Ukraine and Russian positions being shelled:
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/6/9/2103189/-Ukraine-update-Russia-appears-to-be-losing-the-artillery-battle-at-Severodonetsk
Kos of the Daily Kos was a US artillery officer. Another great piece about HIMARS & Logistics:
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2022/6/1/2101780/-Ukraine-Update-Not-enough-Here-s-the-challenge-of-moving-even-four-HIMARS
M30A1 strike: https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1583097916243070979?s=20&t=xXCO7dkibMNWoMrx1rEgcQ
And this is what the M26 cluster munition rockets look like: https://youtu.be/gk_SwLbdlA8?t=40
155mm alternative warhead (dunno if the US uses this):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G18Rwoa7c1k
US Stockpiles DPICM awaiting demilitarization 2019:
https://cswab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/National-Academies-of-Sciences-Alternatives-for-Demil-of-Conventional-Munitions-2019.pdf Archive: https://web.archive.org/web/20191022212737/https://cswab.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/National-Academies-of-Sciences-Alternatives-for-Demil-of-Conventional-Munitions-2019.pdf As of 2019 the US had (Figure 2.3, page 16):
30,000 tons 155mm DPICM / 75# per shell = 800,000
6,000 tons MLRS DPICM / 264# per warhead = 45,000
We don't know the rate they've been destroying them; and we don't know if that is the only classification the rockets are being kept in -- are there more that are off the "available to use" and "emergency use only" books but haven't yet reached the "awaiting demilitarization" classification.
GLSDB:
First, take a 250 pound bomb intended for aircraft and put a GPS-guided glider kit on it.
Then take an old cluster munition MLRS rocket and remove the cluster munition warhead, and strap the bomb you just made onto the rocket motor. Load into a HIMARS or M270 launch vehicle.
Now take everything you think you know about rockets and bombs fly through the air and forget it.
https://youtu.be/kkkfE5yHejc?t=76
Abrams fuel mileage:
Fun fact:
WWII Sherman tanks had fuel economy of 0.4 to 0.9 miles per gallon, and operated typically in 5 tank platoons. Abrams have fuel economy of 0.3 to 0.6 miles per gallon operating typically 4 tank platoons.
Take the middle of the range of fuel economy and go 100 miles. WWII US tank platoon needed 769 gallons. Contemporary US tank platoon needs 888 gallons.
Regarding Motorized forces / 9th Infantry Division experiments in the 1980s:
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA370233
Mobility and initiative were also essential characteristics of such a concept. The division had to be able to move with precision widely dispersed along multiple avenues. Typically, these moves would be at night or during periods of limited visibility. Deception would be used to gain surprise. Further, the division needed to be able to fight in depth on a non-linear battlefield. It would routinely operate deep in the enemy rear using stay-behind, infiltration, or air assault tactics to destroy artillery, command posts, and critical logistics. It must also be capable of withstanding combat in its own rear, protecting criti- cal bases and continuing the flow of services and supplies forward. Finally, the division was to be capable of complementing heavy forces: conducting deep operations, defending the rear, or executing a covering force, while heavier, less agile forces pre- pared for the fight in the main battle area.
Again, execution of the concept depended on uniquely designed organizations and equipment. Light attack battalions (LAB), equipped with fast attack vehicles (FAV), would guide the attack of brigade combat teams away from strongpoints and into the flanks and rear of heavier enemy forces. LABs were also to be able to maneuver deep into the enemy rear, then close with and destroy high value soft-skinned targets with rapid-fire MK-19 40mm machine guns and TOW anti-armor missiles. Combined arms battalions (CAB), consisting of motorized infantry companies and anti-armor companies equipped with a kinetic energy, rapid-firing armored gun system, would contain enemy strength while shaping the conditions for more advantageous attacks to the flanks and rear. CABs would also be the force finally to close with and destroy heavy enemy units in detail, once the fight in depth had appropriately disrupted the coherence of enemy operations.
...
Despite the overall success of the objective design, some shortfalls and limitations were recorded. If ever fixed, motorized forces clearly could not withstand artillery barrage. The counter-recon battle, a tactic not emphasized in the opera- tional concept, turned out to be as important to survivability of motorized forces as mobility, dispersion and deception. The organizational design was optimized for, and tested only, in semi- arid, wide-open terrain. Intuitively, the capability would be reduced in a more confined setting. Deep operations were restricted by the poor cross-FLOT survivability of utility heli- copters. To some extent, this could stem from the inability to replicate the effects of SEAD in a training environment. The division's anti-armor punch and ability to fight in depth were dramatically constrained in weather or visibility conditions grounding helicopters
About electronic warfare: https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-fall-and-rise-of-russian-electronic-warfare
